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Climate emergency – no argument for climate engineering 
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Benduhn and Joshua B. Horton 
 
Current climate engineering proposals do not come close to addressing the complex and 
contested nature of conceivable ‘climate emergencies’ resulting from unabated 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
Continuing business-as-usual as regards greenhouse gas emissions will increase the 
likelihood of ‘dangerous’ climate changes. In response to this risk, Crutzen1 argued in 2006 
that a 5o C warmer world will probably have catastrophic consequences and that the only way 
out may be to engineer the Earth’s climate by injecting aerosols into the stratosphere. The 
possibility of a future ‘climate emergency’ has subsequently been used to justify research on 
climate engineering2 – the deliberate modification of the Earth's climate. Over time, the 
emergency framing has evolved to become a central argument for why we should consider 
investigating solar radiation management (SRM) techniques, which reduce the amount of 
sunlight absorbed at the Earth’s surface. But whether SRM can possibly prevent or counteract 
a climate emergency raises the more fundamental question of what actually is a climate 
emergency. 
 
Tipping points 
 
Crossing a tipping point in the Earth system has often been used as an example of a potential 
climate emergency2. Several ‘policy-relevant’ tipping elements have been identified, which 
could conceivably be tipped by anthropogenic activities this century3. Among these are the 
Atlantic thermohaline circulation, the West Antarctic ice sheet, the Amazon rainforest, and 
the West African monsoon4. However, whether SRM intervention could actually prevent 
these elements from tipping, or counteract tipping that was underway, depends on: (1) their 
predictability, (2) their timescale of tipping, and (3) their reversibility. 
 
A proactive ‘emergency’ response is only conceivable if a tipping point can be 
convincingly forecast in advance. Whilst early warning signals have been found for some 
tipping points4, the methods do not precisely forecast the time of tipping, and only work if a 
system is forced slowly relative to the internal timescale of its dynamics4-6. Under relatively 
rapid climate change, this can prevent ‘slow’ systems such as ice sheets, ocean circulation, or 
major forest biomes7 from giving a reliable early warning signal of approaching tipping. This 
restricts climate engineering to being a reactive response to tipping that is already underway. 
 
‘Slow’ tipping elements, such as ice sheets9,10 or the Amazon rainforest7,8 tend to 
exhibit hysteresis and a high degree of irreversibility. They also tend to lag climate forcing 
such that by the time tipping is perceived their original state may have long since lost its 
stability. This means that excessive climate engineering – i.e. over-cooling the planet – is 
likely to be required to recover their original state (and even then it may not work). The 
steadily-accumulating consequences of ‘slow tipping’ are also not obvious triggers for a rapid 
‘emergency’ response. Notably, evidence suggests that the West Antarctic Ice Sheet has been 
tipped by oceanic warming during the last 20 years11, yet no climate emergency has been 
declared thus far. If it were, it is unlikely that SRM would be able to reverse the ice discharge 
from West Antarctica. 
 
‘Fast’ tipping elements that could trigger an ‘emergency’ situation, such as an abrupt 
shift in a monsoon, are generally related to regional changes in climate. Since SRM, for 
instance by stratospheric aerosol injection, has much larger scale effects, it is not an obvious 
response to such a regional emergency and, owing to spatially heterogeneous hydrological 
responses, may pose more of an additional threat than offer a remedy 12. 
 
Thus, the potential for SRM to respond effectively to tipping point ‘emergencies’ is 
very restricted. Even if there was a case where it could be a logical response, there is one 
final problem: decisions on how much SRM to implement would have to be based on 
experiments with the same global climate models that had failed to predict the occurrence of 
a tipping point in the first place. These models would by definition be insufficiently sensitive 
to climate forcing, and therefore run the risk of recommending an excessive SRM 
intervention. 
 
Extreme events 
 
Another category of potential climate emergencies are weather and climate extremes13, e.g. 
superstorms, heat waves, droughts or floods. These extreme events may well affect entire 
regions over the course of years to decades and their impact may spread along economic 
supply chains around the globe14. The last decade has seen a series of serious weather 
extremes15 and according to the most recent climate change scenarios even more frequent and 
intense extreme events are likely in the future16. Yet, it remains unclear whether decreasing 
the global mean temperature by SRM can reduce the number and intensity of extreme events 
due to the associated distinct regional pattern in temperature and precipitation changes17. 
 
Furthermore, the attribution of extreme weather events to specific physical causes is 
challenging. The question of whether a particular extreme event is caused by human 
influence or is due to natural variability18 is central to the public perception of SRM as 
potential emergency relief. Although there have been advances in detection and attribution of 
some extreme weather events19, it will remain difficult to distinguish signal from noise for 
many types of extreme events (e.g., storms, floods) due to limited observations and 
insufficient ability of climate models to simulate these events20. Hence, if SRM were to be 
implemented at some point in time, it would be cost and time intensive, if not impossible, to 
demonstrate beyond reasonable doubt that SRM prevented, helped, or reduced the occurrence 
and magnitude of extreme events. Conversely, if a certain high-impact extreme weather event 
occurred after SRM intervention, it would be difficult to determine whether SRM caused it. 
 
The consequences of any single extreme event, such as Typhoon Haiyan, Hurricane 
Sandy, or the Russian heat wave of 2010, might be seen as an emergency on its own. But no 
single event, whether attributed to anthropogenic climate change or not, is a sufficient reason 
to declare a global climate emergency. It is the global interaction of such events with socio-
economic and political factors, including elements of power and perception, which might 
eventually determine their designation as global climate emergencies. In this context of 
considerable complexity, decisions on the implementation of SRM can only be made within a 
much broader context than can be diagnosed by natural sciences alone. 
 
Socio-economic emergency 
 
Socio-economic dynamics add a new dimension of complexity to the climate emergency 
problem. Whilst a purely environmental climate emergency might not even have detectable 
socio-economic impacts, an event regarded as a socio-economic climate emergency might be 
based on very few tangible environmental observations. For example, through complex 
global supply chains, the effects of extreme local weather events might spread fast14 and have 
global impacts on critical socio-economic variables such as food prices, commodity prices, 
trade flows, migration, etc. A cascade of such damages could lead to a more general socio-
economic emergency. Indeed, the perception of a single extreme event as a potential threat 
for a strategic region might itself lead to considerable political instability. 
 
In this and any sense, an emergency can only be ‘declared’ rather than be 
‘discovered’. Whether a given phenomenon is regarded as an emergency is ultimately based 
on shared societal understandings of what constitutes an emergency and when it is 
appropriate and legitimate to declare one19. Emergencies are not just pure facts, but a 
combination of facts and values, perceptions and interests. This socio-political character of a 
climate emergency leads ultimately to a number of critical questions21 such as: who will be 
affected?; At what scale?; and, Who is authorized to declare the emergency?” 
 
On top of this complication, a fundamental scientific question remains: Can SRM 
counteract the climatic root of such a socio-economic emergency? The evidence suggests not, 
since it is difficult to envision how SRM could be used effectively to address, for instance, 
interruptions in global supply chains or outbreaks of social unrest. Instead, SRM 
interventions are likely to result in changes in regional climate patterns22 and these will carry 
regional to global socio-economic and political implications on their own. Furthermore, early 
warning signals for such social tipping points are even more difficult to determine23. 
 
Ethical and political issues 
 
It may not be possible to recognize a climate emergency before it takes the form of a declared 
socio-economic and political emergency - for which SRM seems obviously ill-suited as a 
remedy. Since emergencies are combinations of facts and values, they can be ignited by 
political strategies. They can also, like scandals, be triggered by the mass media or by 
politicians. The declaration of an emergency situation is ultimately a political act, and thus 
will inevitably be used for political purposes.  
 
By definition, declaring an emergency invokes a state of exception which carries 
many inherent risks24: the suspension of normal governance, the use of coercive rhetoric, 
calls for ‘desperate measures,’ shallow thinking and deliberation, and even militarization. By 
definition, emergency situations are extraordinary and exceptional. To declare an emergency 
becomes an act of high moral and political significance, since it replaces the framework of 
ordinary politics with one of extraordinary politics25. In cases of humanitarian emergencies, 
for instance, foreign armies might be permitted to operate within a country’s territory. In 
cases of epidemic diseases, civil liberties might be restricted. If these potential violations of 
the principles of international law are to be policed, then we need to avoid casual declarations 
of climate emergencies, even with the best of intentions. Further, if SRM is to be conceived 
and declared as a pre-emptive strike against putative future emergencies, the analogy to pre-
emptive warfare is hard to avoid. The climate emergency narrative as an argument for SRM 
implementation must therefore be constantly scrutinized, especially when it is claimed to 
make scientific sense. There are many tragic examples to learn from of where normal politics 
has been suspended in the name of science and ‘objective evidence’. 
 
No emergency rescue 
Solar radiation management may allow for the control of one characteristic of the climate 
system, for example the global mean temperature. At the same time it can change many other 
characteristics of the system. Whilst a specific class of extreme climatic events might 
potentially be reduced under SRM, it remains completely unclear whether SRM increases or 
decreases other categories of weather extremes, such as those associated with jet stream 
dynamics or monsoon systems. Currently, our models and techniques are insufficient to 
predict the tipping of climatic subsystems and these systems are sufficiently complex to 
prevent human-induced repair after tipping has occurred. Consequently, one can ask whether 
a climate emergency can ever be prevented by SRM, unless it is declared pre-emptively on 
the sole basis of unabated greenhouse gas emissions. In this case, an unprecedented amount 
of risk would have to be taken without knowing which emergencies would actually be 
avoided or even be provoked. 
 
The danger of declaring a climate emergency is further exacerbated when one 
considers the political stakes of doing so. Emergencies are by no means simple geophysical 
occurrences, but rather the outcome of highly complex interactions between the natural 
environment, political interests and social norms. In the context of considerable scientific 
uncertainty - and hence the multiple possible interpretations of scientific results and 
arguments - climate emergencies will be declared on largely political grounds. This 
interlinking of scientific uncertainty and political opportunism should caution against 
implementing SRM as a climate emergency measure, a conclusion we reach on the basis of 
sound scientific arguments, good governance and ethical principles. 
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